North Carolina National Guard Association's Position on Army Plan to Strip Guard of its AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopters

The NCNGA strongly opposes rushing a strategic decision that will have a negative long-lasting impact over several decades.  They support House Resolution 3930 (H.R.3930) which will stop the immediate transfer of Apache helicopters out of the NC National Guard and support creating a National Commission to objectively study a way forward for the Total Army force structure 

The National Guard is the only constitutionally designated, dual mission, physical Combat Reserve of the Army. In order to fill its Constitutional role, the National Guard by law must be manned, trained, and equipped like that of the Active Component Army.

Compared to the Active Component, a National Guard Armed Reconnaissance Battalion (ARB) is one-third the cost during with the same operational performance and capability when mobilized and has, on average, more mature experienced senior and master aviators and maintainers.

Loss of the 1^st Attack Recon Battalion, 130 Aviation Regiment (1-130 ARB), located in Raleigh, NC would lead to significant negative economic impacts to the state and local area including over 125 Full-Time Support positions lost (equates to $14,960,913.55 annually), over 450 Traditional Guardsmen assigned to ARB positions (equates to $19,554,317.55 annually), and considerable turmoil, turnover, and additional cost in retraining and transitioning fully trained, qualified, and experienced personnel.

ARB structure provides significant domestic operations (DOMOPS) capability in the form of mission command, mission support, wheeled tactical vehicles, and power generation. The Active Army’s crooked plan includes stripping the entire National Guard Attack Helicopter force structure (entire battalions) but not an equitable Lift helicopter replacement force structure.

Maintaining AH-64 structure in the Guard allows for reversibility as it takes several years to fully train an Apache pilot to peak proficiency, and 4-5 years to build a combat capable AH-64 battalion. Combat aviation in the National Guard hedges against future threats to National Security with National Guard ARBs fulfilling all mobilization requests and performing equally to active component ARBs over the last 13 years. National Guard combat aviation units provide continued service opportunities for trained active component personnel leaving active duty prior to retirement.

The 1-130 ARB has almost 30 years’ experience in AH-64 Apache training, operations, and maintenance, with national level recognition and awards and a proud list of accomplishments with multiple mobilizations and combat deployments including Operation Desert Shield/Storm; Operation Southern Watch, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

1-130 ARB is highly trained, experienced, and capable.  Our Soldiers are motivated and fully qualified, our family support systems are sound, and our employers continue to be supportive.

The Solution: Support H.R. 3930, the National Commission on the Structure of the Army Act of 2014  

Marine Corps LtCol. Validates National Guard Apache Helicopters

Marine Reaffirms Apache's Guard Role 

Reprinted From: NGAUS Washinton Report, 25 March 2014

A Marine lieutenant colonel serving in Afghanistan may have unknowingly entered the debate on whether AH-64 Apache helicopters should be taken from the Army National Guard.

Lt. Col. S.G. Fosdal wrote a letter last month to Gov. C.L. "Butch" Otter of Idaho praising the "brave men" of Company B, 1st Battalion, 183rd Aviation, out of Boise, Idaho. He said the Apache crews performed heroically during their recent deployment to the war zone.

Referring to one incident in October 2013, he wrote, "Despite heavy ground fire and a chaotic battlefield they provided precise and timely fires against the enemy, killing many and saving the lives of Afghans and US forces alike."

Writing of a similar episode the following month, he said, "Lesser men would have declared the area too dangerous and flown away leaving us to fend for ourselves, but not Company B. They stuck with the troops in the fight and as a direct result of their heroic efforts a Marine is now at home with his family, healing and thankful to be alive."

He wrote that Afghan troops were less apprehensive about going on missions knowing that the Idaho Apaches were watching out for them, adding that "the US Army and Special Forces were also imbued with confidence knowing that your unit had their back."

The Army wants to remove all Apaches from the Army Guard, replacing them with UH-60 Black Hawks. NGAUS and the Army Guard argue that doing so would destroy the Army Guard's combat aviation mission. Fosdal's letter, written to highlight the actions of Guard Apache crews, supports that argument.

"As a state rich in natural resources I thank you and the people of Idaho for sending your most precious resources, its citizens, to serve here in Afghanistan," he wrote. "I hope that you are as proud of them as I am for having served along side them."

Original text may be found at: http://www.magnetmail.net/actions/email_web_version.cfm?recipient_id=987271952&message_id=3873487&user_id=NGAUS&group_id=938156&jobid=17663257#a2

 

National Guard's Cost Efficiency; Response to the Skewed 2008 Rand Report

References:  2008 Rand Study (link below)

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG757.pdf 

Terms.

AC = Active Component, RC = Reserve Component, NG = National Guard, NCNG = North Carolina National Guard (a national leader in large scale domestic emergency response operations).

Rand Paper’s Argument(?):  Using strategic reserves as an operational force equates to loss of a cost efficient alternative. Paper explores other options for maintaining a reserve capability that may be more cost efficient.

What are some flaws in the argument?

1)      The Rand base model posits a 1:6 RC deployment ratio as a continuous reality, but the reality is a 1:5 RC deployment ratio, and only when needed (see number 2 below).

2)      The Rand study looks at the idea of operational reserve from the perspective of deployment frequency – not deployment readiness. Therefore, they assume that the new surge of operational need occurring between 2003-2008 is a constant and will always be required.

A Counter Argument to the Rand Monograph.

No restructuring is required to maintain a cost efficiency advantage in the RC. Removing parallel critical combat capabilities from, specifically, the National Guard is not a solution for cost efficiency, nor does the report assert this; as this COA would both 1) eliminate an operational reserve option from high OPTEMPO surge periods, and 2) removes in entirety options for a strategic reserve combat capability.

Maintaining cost efficiency is both about predictability (which the force generation models have provided), and increasing the number of options available to deal with multiple geographic threats. Transitioning or converting units and assets from the Guard to the AC eliminates predictability and options and only offers options after no less than 5 years after the need arises (creating RC units in time of need, Option C, p.32).

	Peace AC	Peace RC	Peace -  Guard	War AC	War RC	War - Guard
Cost per Month	100%	25%	26%  adjusted to add for FTM (10%) assigned	100%	38%	41%  adjusted for 1:5 deployment readiness
Units Required	3.0 (12:36)	8.0 (9:72)	6.7 (9:60)	3.0 (12:36)	8.0 (9:72)	6.7 (9:60)
Cost per Unit BoG	300%	200%	174%	300%	304%	274%
Relative Cost of RC	67%		58%	101%		90%

 Table 1, Relative Cost per Unit BoG (Adjusted from Rand Study Table A.1 to reflect National Guard reality)

The table above is adjusted to reflect the most conservative reality of units deploying every five years in support of the federal mission. It also increases the cost per month by accounting for FTM assigned to the unit which is not the norm in the other reserve components, but exists in the Guard.

Despite adjusting for more conservative assumptions (based on recent reality), the table still fails to account for apparent cost efficiencies (despite high OPTEMPO surges) that occur over long term application of 1:5 deployment readiness goals. The table above only accounts for a 5-yr relative cost/cost efficiency comparison. The next graphic applies the more conservative estimates from the table above, combining the peacetime and wartime costs, over a long term application (like average equipment life cycle of 20 years), which is more realistic to the ebb and flow of OPTEMPO and global deployment requirements:

20 Year Cost Average	Normal Ops AC	Normal Ops RC (3 deployments)	Normal Ops Guard (3 deployments)
Cost per Month	100%	37%	38%
Units Required	20.0 (12:240)	8.9 (27:240)	8.9 (27:240)
Cost per Unit BoG	2000%	329%	338%
Relative Cost of RC	16%		17%

Table 2, Relative cost combining peacetime and wartime costs adjusted over 20 years

Conclusion. While it is necessarily important to continually explore new options for greater efficiency and predictability, a paradigm shift is not required, nor is it recommended in order to maximize relative cost efficiency of the Reserve Component. Whether the RC is considered Strategic Reserve, or an Operational Reserve is not relevant to the argument; as long as they are available when needed, they may be referred to as either, and may appropriately toggle between the two roles (Table 2) while still maintaining both readiness and cost efficiency over a longer study period. However, the Rand Study overtly omitted some important additional considerations that cannot be overlooked when considering cost/benefit analysis:

1-      The wartime readiness cycle (1:5) which ensures that the RC is properly resourced and individually ready for T10 war, also doubles as the guarantee to US Citizens that those same units and forces (National Guard) will be ready for catastrophic natural or man-made homeland disasters. This mission is exclusively, by US Code, a National Guard mission. It must survive or the alternate environment is federal troops conducting homeland missions. No thank you. I respectfully oppose that notion.

2-      Critical combat capabilities must be included and paralleled, in the RC – if only in part - in order to ensure the nation is committed during T10 conflict (Abrams Doctrine). The National Guard is the best host of these parallel combat capabilities as a result of its community culture and state alignments combined with its unique autonomous T32 mission of domestic operations.

3-      Critical high intensity skill sets must be captured of those leaving the AC. This conclusion does not argue for career bonuses or monetary rewards. These skill sets must be fostered through appropriate parallel force structure in the RC, specifically the National Guard.

The considerations listed above far outweigh the Rand study’s criticism of the cost inefficiency in their challenging calculus. This short response has shown that with assessing the value over the long term, and considering some non-negotiable points, the benefit far outweighs the cost literally and metaphorically, even when experiencing temporary periods of high OPTEMPO, and is non-negotiable for organizations like the North Carolina National Guard (NCNG) when considering the exclusive domestic response mission to protect the lives and property of American Citizens, and protect our American way of life.